Individual and Collective Wage Bargaining
AbstractWage negotiation is modeled as an oceanic game. The employer and unions (if any) are atomic players, interacting with an 'ocean' of infinitesimal individual, unorganized workers. All workers are equally productive inside the firm but may differ in their outside opportunities. The 'worth' of a coalition is its achievable surplus, and the Shapley value of the c-f game thereby defined provides a plausible, equitable wage settlement. Several different levels of unionization are investigated. It is noteworthy that this approach does not introduce specific bargaining procedures; instead (like the core) it builds on cooperative possibilities present in the economic situation itself. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 671.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 1992
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- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00674033 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012.
"Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00674033, HAL.
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