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Bust-Up Takeover Bids and Asymmetric Information

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  • David A. Butz

    (UCLA)

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  • David A. Butz, 1991. "Bust-Up Takeover Bids and Asymmetric Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 615, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:615
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp615.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
    2. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110-110.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    6. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351-351.
    7. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
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