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The Scope of Bargaining Failures With Complete Information

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  • David Porter

    (California Institute of Technology)

  • Jean-Laurent Rosenthal

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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  • David Porter & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1989. "The Scope of Bargaining Failures With Complete Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 564, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:564
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp564.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. In-Koo Cho, 1990. "Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 575-595.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
    5. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    6. Leininger,Wolfgang & Linhart,Peter & Radner,Roy, 1987. "The sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information," Discussion Paper Serie A 95, University of Bonn, Germany.
    7. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
    8. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    9. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
    10. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-436, June.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
    12. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 369-380.
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