Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of government intervention in credit markets when lenders use collateral, interest, and the probability of granting a loan as potential screening devices. Equilibria with and without rationing are examined. The principal theme is that credit policies operate through their effect on the incentive compatibility constraint, which inhibits high-risk borrowers from mimicking the behavior of low-risk borrowers. Any policy that loosens (tightens) the constraint raises (reduces) efficiency. Most government credit programs explicitly attempt to fund investors that cannot obtain private financing. In the model presented here, these subsidies increase the extent of rationing and reduce efficiency. In contrast, policies that subsidize the nonrationed borrowers, or all borrowers, are efficiency enhancing, and reduce the extent of rationing. Due to an administrative error this identical paper was also issued with the same author and title as Working Paper 3024 . Only the earlier paper number should be cited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 554.
Date of creation: 01 May 1989
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William G. Gale, 1989. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 3024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William G. Gale, 1989. "Collateral, Rationing and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 3083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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