Protocol, Payoff, and Equilibrium: Game Theory and Social Modelling
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 366.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 1985
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-06-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2001-08-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2001-06-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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- John G. Riley, 1976.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
071, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
- Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
- Reinhard Selten, 1974. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," Working Papers 023, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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