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Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes

Author

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  • Eric Maskin

    (Harvard University)

  • John G. Riley

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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  • Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1984. "Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes," UCLA Economics Working Papers 354, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:354
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter, 1980. "Fully progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-154, April.
    2. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    3. Foster, James E & Wan, Henry Y, Jr, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Principal-Agent Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 476-484, June.
    4. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    5. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1971. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditures," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(3), pages 409-415.
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