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Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes

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Author Info
Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
John G. Riley (UCLA)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp354.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 354.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1984
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:354

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1971. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 85(3), pages 409-15, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter, 1980. "Fully progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-154, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Roland Strausz, . "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Papers 015, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Antonio Acconcia & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints," CSEF Working Papers 141, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy, revised 01 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  4. Levinson, Arik & Shetty, Sudhir, 1992. "Los Angeles, Mexico City, Cubatao, and Ankara - Efficient environmental regulation : case studies of urban air pollution," Policy Research Working Paper Series 942, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2003. "Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information," CSEF Working Papers 107, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy, revised 01 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles & Szalay, Dezso, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs (Revised Version)," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 779, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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