Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 343.
Date of creation: 28 Jan 2005
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
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- Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment: Extending to the Multi-Period Case," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp1402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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