On the Role of Good Faith in Insurance Contracting
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers with number 26c6897fd1cd46f8f39ffb6caf4e94ed.
Date of creation: 02 Jan 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- A. Dixit & P. Picard, 2002. "On the Role of Good Faith in Insurance Contracting," THEMA Working Papers 2002-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- A. Dixit, 1999. "Adverse Selection and Insurance with Uberrima Fides," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f5, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
- Pierre Picard, 2005. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive," Working Papers hal-00243023, HAL.
- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
- Rob van der Noll, 2006. "The Welfare Effects of Discrimination in Insurance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-012/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- P. Picard, 2002.
"Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets,"
THEMA Working Papers
2002-30, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Picard, Pierre, 2009. "Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 893-919, July.
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