A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting
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Date of creation: 10 May 2006
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- Iaryczower, Matias, 2007.
"Strategic voting in sequential committees,"
1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010.
"Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110 - 1150.
- Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2007. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," NBER Working Papers 13637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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