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Private Information in Repeated Auctions

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  • Johannes Horner
  • Julian Jamison
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000108.

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    Date of creation: 21 Aug 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000108

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    1. Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996. "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9610004, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 1996.
    2. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
    3. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October.
    4. Donald B. Hausch, 1986. "Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1599-1610, December.
    5. Wang, Ruqu, 1991. "Common-value auctions with discrete private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 429-447, August.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
    7. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
    8. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
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    Cited by:
    1. Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 137, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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