Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence

Author Info

John Duffy
Ed Hopkins

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 506439000000000355.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000355

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David K. Levine).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 31-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- John Duffy & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence," ESE Discussion Papers 78, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-02-24 (All new papers)
NEP-COM-2003-02-24 (Industrial Competition)
NEP-GTH-2003-02-24 (Game Theory)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Duncan Whitehead, 2008. "The El Farol Bar Problem Revisited: Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game," ESE Discussion Papers 186, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Laurent Denant-Boemont & Sabrina Hammiche, 2009. "Public Transit Capacity and Users Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox," Working Papers halshs-00405501_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Sabrina Hammiche, 2009. "Public Transit Capacity and Users' Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox," Post-Print halshs-00406223_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 253-272, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 1999. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental 9903001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and Self-Organization in Minority Games: Experimental Evidence," ROCK Working Papers 019, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and self-organization in minority games: experimental evidence," CEEL Working Papers 0215, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
- Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and Self-Organization in Minority Games: Experimental Evidence," LEM Papers Series 2002/09, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Pietro Dindo & Jan Tuinstra, 2006. "A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-073/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jan Tuinstra & Pietro Dindo, 2006. "A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," Working Papers wp06-15, Warwick Business School, Financial Econometrics Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
- Dindo, P.D.E. & Tuinstra, J., 2006. "A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," CeNDEF Working Papers 06-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
Huck, Steffen & Ruchala, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2006. "Competition Fosters Trust," CEPR Discussion Papers 6009, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Ruchala & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2006. "Competition Fosters Trust," Discussion Papers 06-22, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2007. "Competition and coordination in experimental minority games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 241-275, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
- Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2003. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2004. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 79, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
- Hopkins, Ed & Posch, Martin, 2005. "Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 110-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Giovanna Devetag, 2003. "Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Maria Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study," CEEL Working Papers 0214, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning in perturbed asymmetric games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2700 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.