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Public statistics and private experience : Varying feedback information in a take or pass game

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  • Steffen Huck
  • Philippe Jehiel

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000733.

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Date of creation: 02 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000733

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References

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  1. Oechssler, Jorg, 2002. "Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 405-409, November.
  2. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  3. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
  5. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  6. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
  7. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  8. Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000106, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E., 2003. "Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-265, May.
  10. Selten, Reinhard, 1996. "Aspiration Adaptation Theory," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 389, University of Bonn, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Ruchala & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2006. "Competition Fosters Trust," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 06-22, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

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