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The Castle on the Hill

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  • David K Levine

Abstract

A simple example of a stochastic games with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to me, equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for intermediate ranges of discount factors. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 2068.

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Date of creation: 04 Jan 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:2068

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
  4. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-80, December.
  5. Abreu, D. & Dutta, P.K. & Smith, L., 1992. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 92-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, June.
  7. Dutta, P.K., 1991. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 293, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. repec:fth:coluec:565 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. David K Levine & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2127, David K. Levine.

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