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Contrat dynamique de partage de risque avec contraintes d'engagement et épargne

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Author Info
Karine Gobert ()
Michel Poitevin ()

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of combining different insurance schemes on the efficiency of consumption smoothing in an environment without commitment. A savings account is introduced into the self-enforcing risk-sharing model of Thomas and Worrall (1988). The risk averse agent's savings play the role of a collateral, thereby improving consumption smoothing. Furthermore, the optimal use of the savings account relaxes the other agent's self-enforcing constraints. These results depend on the fact that savings are perfectly observable and that the rates of time preference are the same for the two agents, making savings and debt substitutable. If these assumptions are relaxed, consumption smoothing worsens but is still better than what is obtained without savings.

Dans ce papier on regarde l'effet de la combinaison de différents moyens d'assurance sur l'efficacité du lissage de la consommation et les conséquences de l'engagement incomplet. Dans un contrat de partage de risque auto-exécutoire du type développé par Thomas et Worrall (1988), on introduit un compte d'épargne accessible à l'agent qui a de l'aversion pour le risque. L'accumulation d'épargne sert alors de collatéral et le lissage de la consommation est amélioré. De plus, l'utilisation judicieuse du compte d'épargne permet de relâcher les contraintes d'engagement de l'autre agent. Ces résultats dépendent du fait que le stock d'épargne est parfaitement observable et que les taux de préférence pour le présent sont égaux pour les deux agents, ce qui rend épargne et dette envers l'autre agent parfaitement substituables. Si on relâche ces hypothèses, le lissage de la consommation effectué par le contrat est moins efficace0501s il reste meilleur que ce que l'on obtient sans épargne.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 97s-23.

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Date of creation: 01 May 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:97s-23

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Related research
Keywords: Consumption; savings; endogenous liquidity constraint; Consommation; épargne; contrainte de crédit endogène;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

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  1. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1998. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 98/14, Department of Economics, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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