Inefficacité, iniquité et marché politique : bases de l’immobilisme fiscal du Québec

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Inefficacité, iniquité et marché politique : bases de l’immobilisme fiscal du Québec

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Mathieu Laberge ()

Abstract

This paper looks at the Quebec’s tax system – including taxes and tarification – with the perspective of the determination of fiscal policies in the political market. To allow a global reflection on the Quebec’s fiscal policy, it begins with the presentation of general principles used to evaluate a tax system: equity, efficiency, economic growth, transparency and simplicity. The study then presents an overview of the main fiscal instruments used in the province of Quebec and analyses them with the preceding principles. A third section explains briefly a few models of political markets, notably the median voter theory. It also attempts to make a broad overview of Quebec’s median voter. The last section analyses a selection of fiscal policies adopted by the government of Quebec under the spectacle of the principles explained earlier and the political market.

Cette étude propose d’aborder le système fiscal québécois – incluant les impôts, les taxes et les tarifs – sous l’angle de la détermination des politiques fiscales sur le marché politique. Afin de permettre une réflexion globale sur la fiscalité québécoise, elle commence par présenter les principes d’évaluation de la fiscalité : équité, efficacité, impact sur la croissance économique ainsi que transparence et simplicité. L’étude présente ensuite un survol des diverses taxes, impôts et tarifs en vigueur et les analyse au regard des principes élaborés précédemment. Une section présente ensuite succinctement les modèles d’analyse du marché politique, dont la théorie de l’électeur médian. Elle tente également de dresser le portrait de l’électeur médian québécois. La dernière section aborde quelques politiques fiscales du gouvernement du Québec et les scrute sous l’angle des principes de taxation et du marché politique.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2008s-16.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-16

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

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