Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory

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Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory

Author Info

Jim Engle-Warnick ()

Abstract

I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games.

Une étude expérimentale a été menée afin de tester les décisions prises lors de cinq jeux répétés où le nombre de répétitions est inconnu : un jeu de type hawk-dove, un jeu de type chicken, un jeu de confiance, un jeu de coordination et un jeu à somme constante. Les historiques des différents jeux sont comparés afin d’analyser les prises de décisions des participants dans chaque jeu.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2007s-11.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2007s-11

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-05-12 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2007-05-12 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-EXP-2007-05-12 (Experimental Economics)
NEP-GTH-2007-05-12 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Engle-Warnick, J. & Slonim, Robert L., 2006. "Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 95-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2006. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Working Papers 274, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000060, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2009. "Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 785-812, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-30, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory?," ESE Discussion Papers 153, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000724, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001. "Minimax Play at Wimbledon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert L. Slonim, 2001. "Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments," Economics Papers 2001-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert Slonim, 2006. "Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 603-632, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari, 2007. "Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1201, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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