Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
AbstractWe demonstrate the value of equal pay policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics in its series University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series with number 2008-07.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 25-53, 03.
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-09-13 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-09-13 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2008-09-13 (Sports & Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2012. "Sabotage in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 289-292.
- Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12084, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Supervision in Firms," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768900, HAL.
- Annala, Christopher N. & Winfree, Jason, 2011. "Salary distribution and team performance in Major League Baseball," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 167-175, May.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oliver Gurtler, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 051, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: An Overview," CESifo Working Paper Series 4422, CESifo Group Munich.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00768900 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Optimal Organization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 518-527.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sourushe Zandvakili).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.