Fiscal Expectations on the Stability and Growth Pact: Evidence from Survey Data
AbstractThe paper uses survey data to analyze whether the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has changed financial market’s expectations on government budget deficits in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Our findings indicate that accuracy of financial experts’ deficit forecasts has increased in France during the SGP. The Pact seems to have also promoted a gain in credibility of European Commission’s deficit forecasts in France, Italy, and in the UK, particularly after its reform in 2005 and up to December 2007. Nevertheless, the National Fiscal Authorities’ forecasts of France, Germany, and Italy seem to have not been credible among market experts during the SGP. These results suggest that additional measures could be taken in order to make the fiscal rules of the Pact more credible among market specialists.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPII research center in its series Working Papers with number 2010-05.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Expectations; Credibility; Stability and growth pact; Survey data;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2010-04-17 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2010-04-17 (Macroeconomics)
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