Julio Davila () (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. Paris School of Economics) Jan Eeckhout () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) Cesar Martinelli () (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))
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In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
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Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number
0901.
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