Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Juan Miguel Benito

    () (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Publica de Navarra, Spain)

  • Pablo Branas-Garz

    () (Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, Universidad de Granada, Spain and Economic Science Institute Affliate, Chapman University)

  • Penelope Hernandez

    () (Departamento de Analisis Economico y ERI-CES, Spain)

  • Juan A. Sanchis

    () (Departamento de Estructura Econ´omica y ERI-CES, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far for full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model. We find that the percentage of strategic players dramatically increases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of rational subjects.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Branas-Garza_StrategicBehaviorSchellingDynamics.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 11-14.

as in new window
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-14

Contact details of provider:
Postal: One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866
Phone: (714) 628-2830
Fax: (714) 628-2881
Email:
Web page: http://www.chapman.edu/esi/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Subgame perfect equilibrium; segregation; experimental games;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. David Card & Alexandre Mas & Jesse Rothstein, 2007. "Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation," NBER Working Papers 13052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1243-1259, October.
  3. Pancs, Romans & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2007. "Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
  4. Zhang, Junfu, 2004. "Residential segregation in an all-integrationist world," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 533-550, August.
  5. Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-93, May.
  6. Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001011, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Coralio Ballester & Penélope Hernández, 2010. "Bounded Rationality," ThE Papers 10/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-14

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jennifer Cunningham).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.