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Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Miguel Benito

    (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Publica de Navarra, Spain)

  • Pablo Branas-Garz

    (Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, Universidad de Granada, Spain and Economic Science Institute Affliate, Chapman University)

  • Penelope Hernandez

    (Departamento de Analisis Economico y ERI-CES, Spain)

  • Juan A. Sanchis

    (Departamento de Estructura Econ´omica y ERI-CES, Spain)

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far for full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model. We find that the percentage of strategic players dramatically increases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of rational subjects.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Miguel Benito & Pablo Branas-Garz & Penelope Hernandez & Juan A. Sanchis, 2011. "Strategic behavior in Schelling dynamics: A new result and experimental evidence," Working Papers 11-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan Miguel Benito & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Penélope Hernández & Juan A. Sanchis, 2011. "Sequential versus Simultaneous Schelling Models: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(1), pages 60-84, February.
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    5. Pancs, Romans & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2007. "Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coralio Ballester & Penélope Hernández, 2010. "Bounded Rationality," ThE Papers 10/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    2. Drechsler, Martin, 2023. "Improving models of coordination incentives for biodiversity conservation by fitting a multi-agent simulation model to a lab experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    3. Benito-Ostolaza, Juan M. & Sanchis-Llopis, Juan A., 2014. "Training strategic thinking: Experimental evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(5), pages 785-789.
    4. Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza & Penélope Hernández & Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis, 2015. "Are individuals with higher cognitive ability expected to play more strategically?," Working Papers 1507, Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia.
    5. Benito-Ostolaza, Juan M. & Hernández, Penélope & Sanchis-Llopis, Juan A., 2016. "Do individuals with higher cognitive ability play more strategically?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 5-11.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subgame perfect equilibrium; segregation; experimental games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population

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