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Powerful donors and foreign policy: The role of multilateral financial institutions

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  • Espen Villanger

Abstract

The opportunity for a powerful donor country, such as the United States, to use a multilateral financial institution (MFI) strategically in order to promote its own foreign policy goals has received little attention. The gain to a donor that is able to make the World Bank or other MFIs adapt to this donor's view on an issue can be substantial. In that case, all the contributions from the other member nations will also stand behind the MFI's stance on the particular issue, and recipients may feel compelled to comply with this massive counterpart. As a result, influencing MFIs may give much more leverage to a donor's foreign assistance in the foreign policy arena than pursuing the same goals bilaterally with the same amount of aid. We present a model where a donor tries to influence a MFI to put pressure on a recipient to comply with the foreign policy interests of the donor. This game-theoretic multi-agent model with one donor, two MFIs and one recipient illustrates the virtue of using the multilateral as an instrument in foreign policy as seen from the powerful donor's point of view. Similarly, we show how this strategic behavior is damaging for the recipient in particular and for development in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Espen Villanger, 2004. "Powerful donors and foreign policy: The role of multilateral financial institutions," CMI Working Papers WP 2004: 12, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    • Handle: RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2004-12
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    Cited by:

    1. George Mavrotas & Espen Villanger, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006-02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Basu, Kaushik, 2014. "Fiscal policy as an instrument of investment and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6850, The World Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign policies Conditionality Unilateralism;

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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