Market Opening, Downstream Access, and Competition in the Market for Mail
AbstractMarket opening in the postal sector invites competition, but it may also present challenge to financing the universal service obligation (USO) currently in place. USO financing under entry is challenged both by the loss of revenues and scale economies in combination with the affordability constraints on pricing. The incumbent and the entrants would benefit from downstream access as compared to end-to-end competition if the access price is set according to avoided cost. This is due to a better cost allocation between operators. At lower access prices, the incumbent loses margin and therefore incurs losses. Concerning overall welfare implications of downstream access, the simulations reported here yield robustly negative results with bypass. Positive effects can be expected with a worksharing regime and access prices oriented at avoided cost.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Swiss Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0011.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
post; universal service obligation; full market opening; access; liberalization; mail;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
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- De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Matthias Finger & Christian Jaag & Markus Lang & Martin Lutzenberger & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Bestimmung des Regulierungsbedarfs aus ökonomischer Sicht: Angemessenheit und Folgen einer funktionalen oder strukturellen Trennung von Swisscom," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-92, February.
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