Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting
AbstractInflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparency. In this paper, I explore two dimensions of transparency that are typically ignored in this literature — the quality of the information the central bank provides and how widely it publicizes its information. I show how the quality of the central bank’s forecasts and how widely these forecasts are disseminated can affect the central bank’s policy goals.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Working Papers Central Bank of Chile with number 401.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 7, pages 227-263 Central Bank of Chile.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudio Sepulveda).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.