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Global Confidence Crisis: The Value of Waiting and the Coordination Failures Revisited

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  • José De Gregorio

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  • José De Gregorio, 2009. "Global Confidence Crisis: The Value of Waiting and the Coordination Failures Revisited," Economic Policy Papers Central Bank of Chile 31, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchep:31
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    File URL: https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133323/DPE_31.pdf
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    1. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967, January.
    2. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
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