Prudent Banks and Creative Mimics: Can we tell the difference?
AbstractThe recent financial crisis has forced a rethink of banking regulation and supervision and the role of nancial innovation. We develop a model where prudent banks may signal their type through high capital ratios. Capital regulation may ensure separation in equilibrium but deposit insurance will tend to increase the level of capital required. If supervision detects risky behaviour ex ante then it is complementary to capital regulation. However, nancial innovation may erode supervisors' ability to detect risk and capital levels should then be higher. But regulators may not be aware their capacities have been undermined. We argue for a four-prong policy response with higher bank capital ratios, enhanced supervision, limits to the use of complex financial instruments and Coco's. Our results may support the institutional arrangements proposed recently in the UK.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) in its series CAGE Online Working Paper Series with number 75.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Bank Regulation; Financial Crises; Information; Signaling.;
Other versions of this item:
- Andrew Powell & Marcus Miller & Antonia Maier, 2011. "Prudent Banks and Creative Mimics: Can We Tell the Difference?," Research Department Publications 4760, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-03-21 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-03-21 (Central Banking)
- NEP-REG-2012-03-21 (Regulation)
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