False Consensus in Economic Agents
AbstractIn an incentivized experiment we identify a powerful and ubiquitous bias: individuals regard their own characteristics and choices as more common than is the case. We establish this \false consensus" bias in terms of happiness, political stance, mobile phone brand and on the attitude to deference in a hypothetical restaurant choice, and show that it is not limited to the distribution of hard to observe characteristics and choices but also to weight and height. We also show that the bias is not driven by the fact that the tallest, happiest, most left/right-wing, etc. are more salient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) in its series CAGE Online Working Paper Series with number 54.
Date of creation: 2011
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More information through EDIRC
false consensus; saliency; biased beliefs; happiness; politics; height; weight.;
Other versions of this item:
- Proto, Eugenio & Sgroi, Daniel, 2011. "False Consensus in Economic Agents," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 968, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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