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Public Policy and Venture Capital Financed Innovation: A Contract Design Approach Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Julia Hirsch () (Universidad Iberoamerica and CFS)
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment grants depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
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Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number
2006/29.
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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2006Date of revision:
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Keywords: Public Policy Contract Design Venture Capital Moral Hazard Asymmetric Information Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans and Credits
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