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The Dynamics of Venture Capital Contracts

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Author Info
Carsten Bienz () (London School of Economics and Center for Financial Studies)
Julia Hirsch () (University of Frankfurt)

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Abstract

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur’s expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending on the predictability of the development process.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2006/11.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 04 May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200611

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Related research
Keywords: Venture Capital; Corporate Governance; Moral Hazard; Renegotiation; Contract Theory; Empirical Contract Theory; Contract Econometrics;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Serie A 417, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1993.
    Other versions:
  2. Douglas Cumming, 2008. "Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 1947-1982, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jochen Bigus, . "Staging of Venture Financing, Moral Hazard, and Patent Law," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1044, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2002. "Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses," CEPR Discussion Papers 3243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kaplan, Steven & Martel, Frederic & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2003. "How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4161, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(1), pages 1-32, January.
  8. Neher, Darwin V, 1999. "Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(2), pages 255-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004. "Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege & Liang Peng, 2009. "Venture Capital and Sequential Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000046, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2007. "Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2007/13, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Julia Hirsch & Uwe Walz, 2006. "Why Do Contracts Differ between VC Types? Market Segmentation versus Corporate Governance Varieties," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/12, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
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