Franklin Allen () (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) Elena Carletti () (Center for Financial Studies)
Abstract
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number
2005/25.
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