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The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany

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Author Info
Dorothea Schäfer () (German Institute for Economic Research (DIW))
Axel Werwatz () (German Institute for Economic Research (DIW))
Volker Zimmermann () (KfW Group)

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Abstract

Financial theory creates a puzzle. Some authors argue that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts instead of equity contracts since risky but high returns are of relatively more value for a loan-financed firm. On the contrary, authors who focus explicitly on start-up finance predict that entrepreneurs are the more likely to seek equity-like venture capital contracts, the more risky their projects are. Our paper makes a first step to resolve this puzzle empirically. We present microeconometric evidence on the determinants of debt and equity financing in young and innovative SMEs. We pay special attention to the role of risk for the choice of the financing method. Since risk is not directly observable we use different indicators for financial and project risk. It turns out that our data generally confirms the hypothesis that the probability that a young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the financial risk. With regard to the intrinsic project risk, our results are less conclusive, as some of our indicators of a risky project are found to have a negative effect on the likelihood to be financed by private equity.

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Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2004/06.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200406

Note: Prepared for the "Conference on the tenth anniversary of the Taylor rule" in the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, November 22-23, 2002. We are grateful for helpful comments by Ignazio Angeloni, Chris Erceg, Chris Gust, Bennett McCallum, Lars Svensson, Carl Walsh as well as seminar participants at the Carnegie-Rochester conference, the Bank of Canada, the London School of Economics and the European Central Bank. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the European Central Bank. Volker Wieland served as a consultant in the Directorate General Research at the European Central Bank while preparing this paper. Any errors are of course the sole responsibility of the authors.
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Related research
Keywords: monetary policy rules zero interest rate bound liquidity trap rational expectations nominal rigidities exchange rates monetary transmission.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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  1. David B. Audretsch & Erik E. Lehmann, 2004. "Financing High-Tech Growth: The Role of Debt or Equity," Discussion Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Group for Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  16. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F32-F53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Engel, Dirk & Keilbach, Max, 2007. "Firm-level implications of early stage venture capital investment -- An empirical investigation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 150-167, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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