This chapter analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common perception that German accounting is rather "uninformative". This characterization is appropriate from the perspective of an arm’s length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments.
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Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number
2003/16.
Length: 51 pages Date of creation: 16 Jan 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200316
Note: Draft of Chapter 14 of the book "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, forthcoming with Oxford University Press, London 2003. We thank Karl-Herrmann Fischer, Jan Krahnen and Harry Schmidt for helpful comments on earlier versions. Contact details of provider: Postal: Taunusanlage 6, D-60329 Frankfurt am Main Phone: ++49 (0) 69 242941-0 Fax: ++49 (0) 69 24294177 Email: Web page: http://www.ifk-cfs.de/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information K0 - Law and Economics - - General
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