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A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia

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Author Info

  • Olga Lazareva

    ()
    (Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) and Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Andrei Rachinsky

    ()
    (Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR))

  • Sergey Stepanov

    ()
    (New Economic School and CEFIR)

Abstract

In this survey, we describe the current state of corporate governance in Russia and discuss its dynamics and prospects. We review the main mechanisms of corporate governance in the country and relate them to firms’ ownership structures, financial market development and government influence. Finally, we discuss the current trends in Russian corporate governance and its prospects.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0103.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0103

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Web page: http://www.cefir.ru
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Keywords: corporate governance; ownership; expropriation; predatory state; property rights;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mihails Kuznecovs & Sarmistha Pal, 2011. "Does Corporate Governance Reform Necessarily Boost Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from Russia," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 11-06, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  2. Li, Wei-Xuan & Chen, Clara Chia-Sheng & French, Joseph J., 2012. "The relationship between liquidity, corporate governance, and firm valuation: Evidence from Russia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 465-477.
  3. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2008. "The Determinants of Board Composition in a Transforming Economy: Evidence from Russia," RRC Working Paper Series, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 9, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Sergey Solntsev, 2013. "Senior management labor market: from economic growth to crisis. The case of Russia," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics WP BRP 10/MAN/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  5. Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav & Kuznetsov, Andrei & Demina, Natalia & Kuznetsova, Olga, 2013. "Threats to security of property rights in a transition economy: An empirical perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 245-264.
  6. Alexeev, Michael & Weber, Shlomo (ed.), 2013. "The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199759927, October.
  7. World Bank, 2011. "Russia : Reshaping Economic Geography," World Bank Other Operational Studies 13052, The World Bank.

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