Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel- Favoritism in Procurement Auctions
AbstractIn this paper, we investigate interaction between two firms engaged in a repeated procurement relationship modelled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auctioneer (a government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement auction into a symmetric information auction (in bribes) for a common value prize. In a repeated setting we show that favoritism increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders that operates in a stochastically changing environment. A most simple allocation rule where firms take turn in winning independently of stochastic government preferences and firms’ costs is optimal. In each period the selection criteria is fine-tailored to the in-turn winner: the "environment” adapts to the cartel. This result holds true when the expected punishment is a fixed cost. When the cost varies with the magnitude of the distortion of the selection criteria (compared with the true government’s preferences), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. Nevertheless, even in this case favoritism greatly simplifies matters for the cartel. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost for society. Some policy implications of the analysis are suggested.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0074.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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auction; collusion; favoritism; procurement;
Other versions of this item:
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2006. "Public markets tailored for the cartel - Favoritism in procurement auctions -," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590288, HAL.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-10-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-PBE-2006-10-28 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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