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Exclusive Dealing and Large Distributors

Author

Listed:
  • Ryoko Oki

    (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Noriyuki Yanagawa

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

A seminal work by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) explored that an incumbent manufacturer cannot deter an entry by exclusive dealing contract with distributors. This paper extends the flamework of Fumagalli and Motta and examines a situation in which an incumbent distributor tries to deter an entry of efficient distributor by exclusive dealing contracts with manufacturers. The result of this paper is quite opposite to that of Fumagalli and Motta. The exclusion can be successful. It is an unique equilibrium. In this sence, the effects of exclusive dealing depends on the mareket stiructure. Moreover, we extend our model with an entrant even in upstream. It may decrease the possibility of exclusion but may promote the inefficient vertical relation between the entrants.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryoko Oki & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2009. "Exclusive Dealing and Large Distributors," CARF F-Series CARF-F-152, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf152
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    File URL: https://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/old/pdf/workingpaper/fseries/157.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Motta, Massimo & Persson, Lars & Fumagalli, Chiara, 2005. "Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2006. "Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 785-795, June.
    3. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2008. "Buyers’ Miscoordination, Entry and Downstream Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1196-1222, August.
    4. Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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