In the current recession, politicians grant state aid of yet unknown dimensions. But whatis the most efficient measure for granting such aid? We use a theoretical model withfirms that differ in their creditworthiness and compare different types of direct subsidieswith indirectly subsidized loans. We find that, in a large parameter range, politiciansprefer subsidized loans to direct subsidies, because these avoid windfall gains to entrepreneurs,and they economize on screening costs. For similar reasons, subsidized loansmay increase social welfare relative to subsidies. From a welfare perspective, politiciansuse subsidized loans inefficiently often.
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Paper provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its series Ifo Working Paper Series with number
Ifo Working Paper No. 71.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996.
"A Theory of Privatisation,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
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