This article discusses the effects of taxation on the discrete choice of alternative projects. In particular, it is shown that if taxation affects the optimal timing of irreversible investment, then the discrete choice is distorted as well. This result has both methodological and political implications.
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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 723.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, 1984.
"The Taxation of Risky Assets,"
NBER Working Papers
0897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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