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The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany

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  • Veronika Grimm
  • Frank Riedel
  • Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Abstract

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auction design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly employed in Europe.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2001/wp-cesifo-2001-10/cesifo_wp584.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 584.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_584

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Related research

Keywords: auctions; telecommunications; industrial organization; game theory.;

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References

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  1. repec:wop:humbsf:2001-50 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Tilman Börgers & Christian Dustmann, 2005. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 551-578, 07.
  3. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-33, Fall.
  4. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-19 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000. "Implementing efficient market structure," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,19, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  6. Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 534, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 2005. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 508-518, March.
  8. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  9. Menezes, Flavio M., 1996. "Multiple-unit English auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 671-684, December.
  10. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kenneth R. CARTER, 2013. "Next Generation Spectrum Regulation:Price-Guided Radio Policy," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(90), pages 41-62, 2nd quart.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 2002-W20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Hu, Luke & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2012. "License auctions with exit (and entry) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 394, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
  5. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,31, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  6. Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 534, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Tilman Börgers & Christian Dustmann, 2005. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 551-578, 07.

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