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Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

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  • Jon H. Fiva
  • Daniel M. Smith

Abstract

There is a growing literature on the phenomenon of dynasties in democracies, with most studies indicating a causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation under candidate-centered electoral systems. In this study, we explore the relationship between the incumbency advantage and dynasties in the party-centered, closed-list proportional representation context of Norway. We use an original data set of all candidates in Norwegian parliamentary elections from 1945-2013, and apply a regression discontinuity design to evaluate both the incumbency advantage and the inherited incumbency advantage. We document that the incumbency advantage exists even in the party-centered environment of Norway. However, although we document a share of dynasties (7 percent) that is comparable to the United States, we find no evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on their formation. This finding suggests some form of internal party organizational network as a mechanism underlying dynastic politics that operates beyond the incumbency advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon H. Fiva & Daniel M. Smith, 2016. "Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments," CESifo Working Paper Series 5757, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5757
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    1. Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle, 2016. "Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 265-279, April.
    2. Carson, Jamie L. & Engstrom, Erik J. & Roberts, Jason M., 2007. "Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 289-301, May.
    3. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2014. "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression‐Discontinuity Designs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2295-2326, November.
    4. Erikson, Robert S. & Titiunik, Rocío, 2015. "Using Regression Discontinuity to Uncover the Personal Incumbency Advantage," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 10(1), pages 101-119, May.
    5. Eggers, Andrew C. & Hainmueller, Jens, 2009. "MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 513-533, November.
    6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    7. Yasushi Asako & Takeshi Iida & Tetsuya Matsubayashi & Michiko Ueda, 2014. "Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan," Working Papers 1412, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Verdier, Thierry & Silve, Arthur, 2023. "The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-seeking Elites," CEPR Discussion Papers 18165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Berg, Heléne, 2018. "Is It Worth It? On the Returns to Holding Political Office," Research Papers in Economics 2018:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    3. González, Felipe & Muñoz, Pablo & Prem, Mounu, 2021. "Lost in transition? The persistence of dictatorship mayors," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    4. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
    5. Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Stommes, Drew & Aronow, P. M. & Sävje, Fredrik, 2023. "On the Reliability of Published Findings Using the Regression Discontinuity Design in Political Science," I4R Discussion Paper Series 22, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    7. Heléne Berg, 2018. "Is It Worth It? On the Returns to Holding Political Office," CESifo Working Paper Series 7406, CESifo.
    8. Bartnicki, Sławomir & Alimowski, Maciej & Górecki, Maciej A., 2022. "The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Berg, Heléne, 2020. "On the returns to holding political office (Is it worth it?)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 840-865.
    10. Palguta, Ján & Pertold, Filip, 2021. "Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1020-1047.
    11. Fiva, Jon H. & Røhr, Helene Lie, 2018. "Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 142-156.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynasties; incumbency advantage; regression discontinuity; Norway;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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