Gerontocracy Revisited. Unilateral Transfer to the Young May Benefit the Middle-Aged
AbstractIt has been argued that in the absence of altruism, intergenerational transfers can survive only if the old are net recipients. I prove that this need not hold in an over-lapping generations model with a fixed factor. For example, the middle-aged owning land may gain by providing public education even when they cannot tax the young. This requires that labor is not mobile. Furthermore, establishing public education may benefit only the generation which pays for education twice, first for itself and then for the next generation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 500.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Intergenerational goods; education; land; gerontocracy;
Other versions of this item:
- Poutvaara, Panu, 2004. "Gerontocracy revisited: unilateral transfer to the young may benefit the middle-aged," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 161-174, January.
- Panu Poutvaara, 2002. "Gerontocracy Revisited: Unilateral Transfer to the Young May Benefit the Middle-aged," Discussion Papers 275, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
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