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Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-control

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Denis Garin
  • Alix Masse
  • Pierre-Carl Michaud

Abstract

Using a unique dataset on health club attendance from Quebec, we look at the relationship between actual and expected attendance and how these relate to a reported measure of self-control problems at the time of contract signing. We find that a large majority of contract choices appear inconsistent purely on financial grounds: 47.5% of members would be better off paying the fee for a single visit each time they go to the gym rather than signing a long-term contract. The median total cost of making a mistake on this decision is $262. We then compute that almost all members have made the right decision once we use subjective expectations of the number of visits per week at the time of contract choice. Next, we study how actual attendance following contract choice is related to baseline reports of self-control. We find that reports of self-control problems at baseline are associated with low future attendance and that attendance decreases faster, in particular after New Year. Finally, those with a large gap between expected and realized attendance have a much lower probability of contract renewal. Our results are consistent with a model of health club participation where agents underestimate the severity of their self-control problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Denis Garin & Alix Masse & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2014. "Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-control," CESifo Working Paper Series 4926, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4926
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rohde, Kirsten I.M. & Verbeke, Willem, 2017. "We like to see you in the gym—A field experiment on financial incentives for short and long term gym attendance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 388-407.
    2. Griffith, Rachel & O'Connell, Martin & Smith, Kate & Cherchye, Laurens & De Rock, Bram & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2017. "A new year, a new you? Heterogeneity and self-control in food purchases," CEPR Discussion Papers 12499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Wolfgang Habla & Paul Muller, 2021. "Experimental evidence of limited attention at the gym," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1156-1184, December.
    4. Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane & Zhou, Li, 2015. "Physical Activity, Present Bias, and Habit Formation: Theory and Evidence from Longitudinal Data," Working Papers 2015-6, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    5. Andrej Woerner, 2021. "Overcoming Time Inconsistency with a Matched Bet: Theory and Evidence from Exercising," CESifo Working Paper Series 9503, CESifo.
    6. Finley, Theresa, 2021. "Free riding in the monastery: Club goods, the cistercian order and agricultural investment in Ancien Regime France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 318-336.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-control; gym attendance; expectations; obesity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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