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Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting

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  • Philippe De Donder
  • Eugenio Peluso

Abstract

We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that empirically observed departures from these assumptions are small enough that a majority of French voters should support a positive size of this program. We also provide a sufficient condition on this probability function under which more targeting results in a lower equilibrium size of the transfer system.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe De Donder & Eugenio Peluso, 2014. "Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting," CESifo Working Paper Series 4915, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4915
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    paradox of redistribution; a program for the poor is a poor program; majority voting; social housing in France;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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