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Short Run Effects of Bleaker Prospects for Oligopolistic Producers of a Non-Renewable Resource

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  • Kristine Grimsrud
  • Knut Einar Rosendahl
  • Halvor Briseid Storrøsten
  • Marina Tsygankova

Abstract

In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition, both the resource rent and current prices influence a large resource owner’s optimal supply. New information regarding future market conditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current supply. Bleaker demand prospects tend to accelerate resource extraction. A more pessimistic outlook for future demand may, however, slow down the early resource extraction of producers with sufficiently large resource stocks and thus more limited resource rent, because the supply from these producers is driven more by current market considerations than by changes in the resource rent. As producers with relatively smaller resource stocks accelerate their supply in response to bleaker demand prospects, producers with sufficiently large resource stocks will reduce their current supply. A numerical model of the European gas market illustrates that the effect of the shale gas revolution is an accelerated supply by most gas producers, but a reduced supply by Russia who loses market shares even before the additional gas enters the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristine Grimsrud & Knut Einar Rosendahl & Halvor Briseid Storrøsten & Marina Tsygankova, 2014. "Short Run Effects of Bleaker Prospects for Oligopolistic Producers of a Non-Renewable Resource," CESifo Working Paper Series 4579, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4579
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    Cited by:

    1. Finn Roar Aune, Rolf Golombek , Arild Moe, Knut Einar Rosendahl and Hilde Hallre Le Tissier, 2015. "Liberalizing Russian Gas Markets - An Economic Analysis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Adelman S).
    2. Knut Einar Rosendahl & Diana Roa Rubiano, 2019. "How Effective is Lithium Recycling as a Remedy for Resource Scarcity?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(3), pages 985-1010, November.
    3. Kristine Grimsrud, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Halvor B. Storrøsten, and Marina Tsygankova, 2016. "Short Run Effects of Bleaker Prospects for Oligopolistic Producers of a Non-renewable Resource," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource extraction; Cournot competition; European gas market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q33 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Resource Booms (Dutch Disease)
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources

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