Efficiency of Decentralized Road Investment and Pricing in a Multi-Jurisdictional City with Spillovers
AbstractThis paper shows that the inefficiency of fiscal decentralization in the presence of spillovers, a main tenet of the decentralization literature, is overturned in a particular transportation context. In a monocentric city where road (bridge) capacity is financed by budget-balancing user fees, decentralized capacity choices (made by individual zones within the city) generate the social optimum despite the presence of spillovers. This conclusion is closely tied to the famous self-financing theorem of transporation economics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4384.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
decentralization; road pricing; congestion; spillovers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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