Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jörg Franke
  • Wolfgang Leininger

Abstract

We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We rather extend the model of Morgan (2000), who used fair raffles as voluntary contribution schemes, to unfair or biased raffles, which we show to be equivalent to fair raffles whose tickets are sold to consumers at different individual prices. We give a detailed account of the solution for the case of two different consumers and discuss its implications for the general case of many consumers.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-02/cesifo1_wp4109.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4109.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4109

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: public good provision; biased lotteries; charities;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2013. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79998, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  3. Martin Kolmar & martin.kolmar@unisg.ch & Andreas Wagener, 2012. "Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 161-179, July.
  4. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
  5. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  6. Kotchen, Matthew J., 2007. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 91-96, November.
  7. Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Väth, 2009. "Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 2744, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 451-465, 06.
  9. Marco Faravelli, 2011. "The Important Thing Is Not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 1-22, 02.
  10. Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.
  11. Morgan, John, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 761-84, October.
  12. Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Providing public goods in two steps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 173-178, May.
  13. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Efficient raffling of public goods
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-04-02 14:07:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Martin Kolmar & Dana Sisak, 2014. "(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 239-259, June.
  2. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4228, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Sebastian J. Goerg & John Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2013. "Priming the charitable pump: An experimental investigation of two-stage raffles," Working Papers wp2013_05_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.