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Provision of a Public Good with Altruistic Overlapping Generations and Many Tribes

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  • Larry S. Karp

Abstract

Intergenerational altruism and contemporaneous cooperation are both important to the provision of long-lived public goods. Equilibrium climate protection may depend more sensitively on either of these considerations, depending on the type of policy rule one examines. This conclusion is based on a model with n tribes, each with a sequence of overlapping generations. Tribal members discount their and their descendants’ utility at different rates. Agents in the resulting game are indexed by tribal affiliation and the time at which they act. The Markov Perfect equilibrium is found by solving a control problem with a constant discount rate and an endogenous annuity.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3895.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3895

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Related research

Keywords: overlapping generations; altruism; time consistency; Markov Perfection; differential games; climate policy;

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  1. Sumaila, Ussif R. & Walters, Carl, 2005. "Intergenerational discounting: a new intuitive approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 135-142, January.
  2. Karp, Larry & Zhang, Jiangfeng, 2006. "Regulation with anticipated learning about environmental damages," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 259-279, May.
  3. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
  4. Maria Saez-Marti & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2005. "Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org 784828000000000001, www.najecon.org.
  5. Maik T. Schneider & Christian Traeger & Ralph Winkler, 2012. "Trading Off Generations: Infinitely Lived Agent Versus OLG," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3743, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Christian Traeger, 2012. "Why Uncertainty Matters - Discounting under Intertemporal Risk Aversion and Ambiguity," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3727, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Li, Chuan-Zhong & Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf, 2000. "Renewable Resources and Economic Sustainability: A Dynamic Analysis with Heterogeneous Time Preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 236-250, November.
  8. Reyer Gerlagh & Matti Liski, 2012. "Carbon Prices for the Next Thousand Years," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3855, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. R. Glenn Hubbard & Robert J. Weiner, 1985. "Nominal Contracting and Price Flexibility in Product Markets," NBER Working Papers 1738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
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