Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kenji Fujiwara
  • Ngo Van Long

Abstract

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader. Among the three game-theoretic outcomes, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country’s leadership.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2012/wp-cesifo-2012-01/cesifo1_wp3721.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3721.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3721

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: dynamic game; exhaustible resource; Stackelberg leadership; optimal tariff;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2010. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market Under Bilateral Monopoly," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2010s-16, CIRANO.
  2. Wirl Franz, 1994. "Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, January.
  3. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
  4. Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
  5. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
  6. Tahvonen, Olli, 1996. "Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-17, January.
  7. James L. Smith, 2009. "World Oil: Market or Mayhem?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 145-64, Summer.
  8. Van Long Ngo, 2010. "A Survey Of Dynamic Games In Economics:," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 1, number 7577.
  9. Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2009. "A dynamic pricipal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differentioal game," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 0905, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3721. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.