Lobbying and Bribes - A Survey-Based Analysis of the Demand for Influence and Corruption
AbstractWe use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that are larger, older, exporting, government-owned, are widely held and/or have fewer competitors have more political influence, perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes less often; (c) influence increases sales and government subsidies and in general makes the firm have a more positive view on the government. In sum, we show that “strong” firms use their influence to bend laws and regulations, whereas “weak” firms pay bribes to mitigate the costs of government intervention.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3496.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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