A Tax on Tax Revenue. The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany
AbstractSeveral recent studies suggest that equalizing transfers in a federal system may distort the tax policy decisions of states. We study this issue for the German federal fiscal system. In a simple theoretical model, we first identify a substitution and an income effect of equalizing transfers. Our main hypothesis is that both effects should tend to reduce tax revenue of German states. We perform various empirical tests which confirm this hypothesis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 333.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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