How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country: An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard
AbstractGiven that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income, and on the return to educational investment. It also makes school enrollment compulsory and, if the child wage rate is sufficiently high, sets a ceiling, decreasing in parental income, on overt child labour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3077.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
child labour; education; uncertainty; moral hazard;
Other versions of this item:
- Cigno, Alessandro, 2010. "How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country : An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 474, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
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