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Efficient Education Policy - A Second-Order Elasticity Rule

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  • Wolfram F. Richter

Abstract

Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labor, education, and saving, efficient education policy is characterized for a Ramsey-like scenario in which the government is constrained to use linear instruments. It is shown that education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. The strength of second-best subsidization increases in the elasticity of the elasticity of the earnings function. This second-order elasticity rule extends the well-known Ramsey-Boiteux inverse elasticity rule.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2969.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2969

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Keywords: endogenous choice of education; second-best efficient taxation; linear instruments; finite periods; Ramsey’s Rule; inverse elasticity rule;

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  1. Wolfram F. Richter, 2009. "Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition," Ruhr Economic Papers 0140, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  2. Lans Bovenberg, A. & Jacobs, Bas, 2005. "Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2005-2035, December.
  3. Bas Jacobs & A. Lans Bovenberg, 2011. "Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 957-971, December.
  4. Christoph Braun, 2010. "Optimal Taxation of Education with an Initial Endowment of Human Capital," Ruhr Economic Papers 0210, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
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  1. repec:got:cegedp:137 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Richter, Wolfram F., 2013. "Mincer Equation, Power Law of Learning, and Efficient Education Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 7280, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Wolfram F. Richter & Lars Kunze, 2011. "Taxing Human Capital Efficiently when Qualified Labour is Mobile," CESifo Working Paper Series 3366, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Wolfram F. Richter & Berthold U. Wigger, 2012. "Besteuerung des Humanvermögens," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1-2), pages 82-102, 02.
  5. Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Student loans in a tiebout model of higher education," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 137, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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